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Abstract 
Delegation is a powerful mechanism to provide flexible 
and dynamic access control decisions. Delegation is 
particularly useful in federated environments where 
multiple systems, with their own security autonomy, are 
connected under one common federation. Although many 
delegation schemes have been studied, current models do 
not seriously take into account the issue of delegation 
commitment of the involved parties. In order to address 
this issue, this paper introduces a new mechanism to help 
parties involved in the delegation process to express 
commitment constraints, perform the commitments and 
track the committed actions. This mechanism looks at two 
different aspects: pre-delegation commitment and post-
delegation commitment. In pre-delegation commitment, 
this mechanism enables the involved parties to express the 
delegation constraints and address those constraints. The 
post-delegation commitment phase enables those parties 
to inform the delegator and service providers how the 
commitments are conducted. This mechanism utilises a 
modified SAML assertion structure to support the 
proposed delegation and constraint approach.. 
Keywords: Delegation, Commitment, SAML, Access 
Control, Federated Systems. 
1 Introduction 
In federated information processing environments which 
contain multiple component systems and associated users, 
any entity may be constrained on how it acts upon other 
entities. In general, one entity has a set of privileges for 
some services that it can access. For traditional systems, a 
static set of privileges for each user would be adequate. 
However, in federated systems this is insufficient, 
especially in circumstances where it is difficult to 
anticipate in advance the set of privileges a user will 
need. In addition to this, there are problems with 
inconsistency in authentication and authorisation 
decisions between the member systems and/or between 
the federation and a local authority. Overcoming these 
issues while still being able to maintain the autonomy of 
member systems is a big challenge as it is difficult to 
make the whole federation understand a consistent set of 
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identities and access control policies. In this context, 
delegation appears to be a potential solution as it provides 
a promising means for maintaining consistency of user 
attributes and authorisation states. This makes delegation, 
especially user to user delegation (ad hoc delegation) 
(Section 2), particularly useful in federated environments. 
Although many delegation schemes have been studied 
(Gomi et al. 2005; Madsen et al. 2005; Wu et al. 2005; 
Bhatti et al. 2006; Crampton and Khambhammettu 2006; 
Fragoso-Rodriguez et al. 2006; Joshi and Bertino 2006; 
Shen 2006; Wang and Osborn 2006; Zhang et al. 2006), 
current models do not seriously take into account the 
issue of delegation commitment of the involved parties. 
This paper attempts to address this problem.  
This paper discusses the concept of delegation 
commitment and proposes a scheme to monitor and keep 
track of the commitments of the involved parties when 
requesting a delegation assertion for a particular task. The 
proposed mechanism helps the parties involved in the 
delegation process to express commitment constraints, 
honour the commitments and track the committed actions. 
The mechanism looks at two different aspects: pre-
delegation commitment and post-delegation commitment. 
In pre-delegation commitment, the mechanism enables 
the involved parties to partially express the delegation 
conditions and constraints. The post-delegation 
commitment enables those parties to inform the delegator 
and service providers how the pre-delegation 
commitments, which include some delegation conditions 
and constraints, have been conducted. Revocation of 
delegation and associated issues are out of scope of this 
paper and are considered as future work. 
Section 2 reviews preliminary concepts with respect to 
delegation and commitment. Section 3 briefly discusses 
related work. The remainder of this paper will 
concentrate on the substantial issue of delegation 
commitment of the involved parties. Section 4 and 
Section 5 look at the issues of delegation commitment 
and the use of SAML assertions to express delegation 
commitment. Section 6 and Section 7 discuss some 
current unsolved issues and conclude the paper with some 
potential avenues for future work. 
2 Preliminaries 
Delegation 
Delegation is a mechanism for assigning privileges as 
well as other attributes to users. The user who performs a 
delegation is referred to as a “delegator” and the user 
who receives a delegation is referred to as a “delegatee”. 
A privilege attribute will be “delegatable” if it can be 
successfully granted or transferred from one user to 
another (Sandhu 1998; Sandhu 2005; Crampton and 
Khambhammettu 2006).   
Schaad (Schaad 2003) and Crampton and 
Khambhammettu (Crampton and Khambhammettu 2006) 
describe clearly the fundamental concepts of delegation. 
From the administrative perspective, there are two types 
of delegation (Crampton and Khambhammettu 2006): 
administration (administrative delegation) and user 
delegation (ad hoc delegation). Administration is the 
basic form of delegation in which a security administrator 
or authority assigns privilege attributes to users. The 
ability to assign does not necessarily mean that 
administrator possesses the capability to use the assigned 
privileges or attributes. Depending on the access control 
model, this process may not require great administrative 
effort and can, itself, be subject to constraints on what can 
be assigned and to whom. However, this process only 
meets basic and static requirements of access control. It 
fails to provide the degree of dynamic flexibility required 
to support access control decisions in federated systems. 
On the other hand, user delegation occurs between two or 
more users who do not necessarily possess any special 
administrative authority. In this form, rights are not 
assigned by the administrator or authority but are granted 
or transferred from one user to another. Specifically, user 
delegation allows a user to assign the whole or a subset of 
his/her rights to other users. A user delegation operation 
requires that the user performing the delegation must 
possess the capability to use the delegated attributes. It is 
widely accepted that an administrative delegation 
operation is often long-lived and more durable 
(permanent) than a user delegation operation that is short-
lived (temporary) and intended for a specific purpose 
(Schaad 2003; Crampton and Khambhammettu 2006). 
Some authors argue that both parties in the delegation 
process may need to meet certain conditions and comply 
with certain commitments in order to make the delegation 
happen successfully (Castelfranchi 2004).  
From the operational transaction, direct delegation is 
defined as the delegation in which the delegator directly 
sends the delegation assertion to the delegatee. In 
contrast, indirect delegation or multi-step delegation is 
performed with the involvement of one or many 
intermediate parties which can forward the delegation 
assertion from the delegator to the delegatee.  
Delegation may also be classified into two categories: 
grant delegation and transfer delegation (Barka and 
Sandhu 2000; Crampton and Khambhammettu 2006). In 
grant delegation, a successful delegation operation allows 
a delegated attribute to be available to both the delegator 
and delegatee. So after a grant delegation, both delegatee 
and delegator will share a subset of attributes in common. 
However, in transfer delegation, following a successful 
delegation operation, the ability to use delegated 
attributes is transferred to the delegatee and the delegated 
attributes are no longer available to the delegator. The 
grant delegation model makes the availability of 
attributes increase monotonically with delegations 
(Crampton and Khambhammettu 2006). The grant 
delegation model is primarily concerned with allowing 
the delegatee to use the delegated attributes. On the other 
hand, in transfer delegation, besides allowing the 
delegatee to use the delegated attributes, the mechanism 
must be able to prevent the use of the delegated attributes 
by the delegator. This requirement makes transfer 
delegation policy enforcement more difficult (Aura 1999; 
Schaad 2003; Crampton and Khambhammettu 2006). 
While some business processes may require grant 
delegations, it is often desirable that sensitive access 
rights may not be available to a large number of users (at 
any given time). Such requirements are usually expressed 
as cardinality constraints in an access control policy 
(Sandhu 1990). Transfer delegation policies prove to be 
more useful when an access control policy specifies 
cardinality limits on the availability of access rights 
between users. 
Commitment in the Delegation Process 
In any delegation process, the delegation transaction is 
approved or agreed by both parties only after both can 
reach an agreement about the duties or responsibilities of 
the involved parties. This forms the delegation 
commitment of the involved parties which can be 
understood as the course of action about what they have 
to do before and after the delegation takes place to 
actually complete the delegation process. This forms an 
important aspect of delegation which is not adequately 
addressed by many delegation models. Consider the 
following scenario in which user B on system S(2) wants 
to access resource R(1) on system S(1) for which B does 
not have the necessary privileges or attributes. User B 
(the delegatee) requests user A (the delegator) on system 
S(1) to delegate the necessary credential. B can stipulate 
that they only require access to R1 three times for a 
period of one day. The commitment of the delegatee in 
this scenario is composed by the following factors: access 
to R1, only three times and only valid for a period of one 
day. The delegator can agree to perform a grant 
delegation. Then the commitment of delegator in this 
scenario is grant delegation for three times and for one 
day. The delegation commitment can include some 
conditions and constraints on the delegation process 
notably duration and service invocation times. However, 
commitment is not a condition or constraint with respect 
to roles/privileges and their conflict resolution; systems 
constraints such as workload, etc. (Atluri and Warner 
2005). Part of the commitment is the trusted 
responsibility, for example, activities which the delegator 
believes that the delegatee will perform to effectively 
comply with the delegation. An example for this type of 
activity is that after each service invocation, the delegatee 
has to reduce the allowed number of service invocation 
by one.  This is the delegatee’s commitment as the 
delegator can not monitor how the delegatee controls the 
times of usage of the delegation assertion. 
Optimistic delegation 
At the time a delegator receives a delegation request, it 
does not necessarily know in advance whether a 
particular set of delegated privileges will be useable by 
the delegatee, since it may not have a complete 
understanding of the current security context of the 
delegatee, the current set of roles and privileges of the 
delegatee, the policies of the delegatee’s systems, etc. To 
avoid making a delegation that will not be honoured, the 
delegator could contact the relevant Authorisation 
Authorities to ask "if I delegate these privileges to user X 
from domain Y, will they be honoured?" But asking this 
question in advance for each delegation transaction is 
clearly inefficient as the authorisation authority will then 
need to evaluate the request twice - once for the pre-
approval and once for the actual execution by the 
delegatee. 
Therefore, the delegator agrees to conduct the delegation 
transaction, it does so based on its best knowledge of the 
constraints and conditions for the delegation transaction, 
for example, the policies of its systems, the attributes of 
the privilege attribute itself, etc. It does not guarantee that 
the delegatee will be able to successfully use this attribute 
privilege for service invocation. Naturally, this is the best 
effort delegation of the delegator or in other words, an 
optimistic delegation. 
Thus, one of the advantages of our proposed scheme is 
that, via the pre- and post-delegation commitment of the 
involved parties, it supports optimistic delegation wherein 
the delegator simply assumes that the delegation will 
succeed - it does not ask the authorisation authority in 
advance to confirm that the delegation will be effective. If 
the delegation fails, the delegation commitment 
framework provides a way of recording, identifying, 
reporting and correcting the problem. Therefore, it is safe 
to say that optimistic delegation is more efficient as it 
does not require pre-approval of the Authorisation 
Authority.  
3 Related Works 
Recently, delegation issues have attracted a considerable 
effort from the research community. Most, if not all, 
research was conducted based on RBAC. Most of the 
proposals that study delegation in the context of role-
based models employ grant delegation (Barka and 
Sandhu 2000; Na and Cheon 2000; Zhang et al. 2001; 
Zhang et al. 2003; Zhang et al. 2003; Tamassia et al. 
2004; Wainer and Kumar 2005). Temporal transfer 
delegation with role hierarchies is also addressed in some 
papers (Crampton 2003; Crampton and Khambhammettu 
2006; Joshi and Bertino 2006).  
In 2000, Na and Cheon proposed a basic role delegation 
method and protocol which can handle simple delegation 
operations (Na and Cheon 2000). Similarly, Barka and 
Sandhu also presented a framework for their first notion 
of delegation called RBDM0 (Barka and Sandhu 2000). 
This role-based delegation model is based on RBAC96, 
and provides support for user delegation. RBDM0 is a 
total delegation model which means the delegator 
delegates all the permissions, particularly permissions in 
a role to a delegatee by user to role assignment. Then the 
original user of the role assigns a delegatee to the role. 
Revocation is done by a timeout mechanism and by 
grant-independent revocation. The authors also extend the 
model to support partial delegation and two-step 
delegation by defining two different types of permissions 
in a role: delegatable permissions and non-delegatable 
permissions. The delegatee can only have delegatable 
permissions. In their second model – RBDM1, Barka and 
Sandhu added role hierarchies and source dependent 
cascading revocation (Barka and Sandhu 2004), which is 
done automatically along the delegation chain (Wang and 
Osborn 2006).  
In another effort, Zhang et al. extended the RBDM0 to 
construct a new model called RDM2000 (Zhang et al. 
2001). The RDM2000 model supports hierarchical roles 
and multi-step delegation, which are not supported in the 
original RBDM0 model. They also specified a rule-based 
language to describe the policies of RDM2000. 
Revocation is separated into two categories: revocation 
by delegation duration restriction which can be 
considered as a timeout mechanism and explicit user 
revocation. Recently, Ahn et al. published some papers 
for access control in a collaborative environment such as 
health care or law enforcement using this delegation 
model (Zhang et al. 2002; Zhang et al. 2003; Tolone et al. 
2005). The rule-based approach is very powerful for 
constraint enforcement (Yin et al. 2004; Wang and 
Osborn 2006). However it only considers the regular user 
to user delegation.  
Zhang, Oh and Sandhu presented a new permission-based 
delegation model (PBDM) in 2003 (Zhang et al. 2003). 
This model fully supports partial and multi-step 
delegation. This model is, later, extended and presented 
in three variants called PBDM0, PBDM1 and PBDM2. 
As RBDM0 and RDM2000, all variants are based on the 
RBAC96 model and use user to role assignment to 
perform the delegation operations. PBDM2 is designed to 
support role to role and permission delegation (Zhang et 
al. 2003). The PBDM family can support multi-step 
delegation, but they neither support constraints in 
delegation, nor delegation in distributed environments 
(Crampton and Khambhammettu 2006). 
In 2006, based on the RBDM and PBDM family, 
Crampton and Khambhammettu proposed an extended 
scheme which incorporated many features of both 
families (Crampton and Khambhammettu 2006). This 
model is argued as more conservative, safer, more fine-
grained and more manageable than the two predecessors. 
This model argued that using only relations such as can-
delegate and can-receive for controlling delegations may 
not be efficient for implicitly handling updates to various 
RBAC relations and proposed an alternative way of 
controlling delegations using the concept of 
administrative scope (Crampton and Khambhammettu 
2006). The administrative scope model is dynamic and 
implicitly handles any updates to RBAC relations, in 
particular the role hierarchy relation. In this model, both 
grant delegation and transfer delegation are supported. In 
the domain of DRM research, Petkovic and Koster also 
implemented a framework to grant and transfer user 
privilege based on constraint delegation (Petkovic and 
Koster 2005). 
In 2005, in an effort to address constraint issues in 
delegation, Atluri and Warner studied delegation in 
workflow management and introduced a conditional 
delegation model (Atluri and Warner 2005). This model 
introduces several types of constraint (conditions) for the 
delegation such as intervals, workload limitations, task 
attributes, etc. In general, the constraints are also divided 
into four different types: authorisation constraints, 
delegation constraints, task dependency requirements and 
role activation constraints. In the delegation context, there 
are three kinds of conditions for delegation (Wang and 
Osborn 2006):  
• A temporal delegation condition is a condition 
on the delegation start time and/or the time 
interval of the delegation.  
• A workload delegation condition is a condition 
of a specific workload level.  
• Value delegation conditions control a delegation 
by attributes.  
Several rules are defined to support conditional 
delegation. Some constraints can be verified before the 
execution of workflow and some must be verified and 
enforced during workflow execution. The authors call this 
verification delegation consistency; the former is called 
static consistency and the later is called dynamic 
consistency (Wang and Osborn 2006).  
In a similar approach, Wainer and Kumar considered 
different constraints that can be applied to RBAC 
delegation and presented a more fine-grained user 
delegation model (Wainer and Kumar 2005). Unlike 
Atluri and Warner’s approach, this model distinguishes 
two types of access rights: object rights and delegation 
rights with constraints. However, similarly to other 
models, it uses user to role assignments to perform 
delegation. An interesting thing about this model is its 
revocation method. The revocation is source dependent 
cascading revocation (Wang and Osborn 2006). This 
method was expressed by the authors as “revocation with 
downgrade” in which the model tests and updates the 
depth for cascading revocation. An extension of this 
model with time-restricted delegation which uses timeout 
to revoke the delegation is also proposed (Wainer and 
Kumar 2005). In 2006, Wang and Osborn proposed a 
hybrid approach. Their model used a combination of user 
to group assignment to perform partial and role to role 
delegation, while it employed user-role assignment to do 
total delegation (Wang and Osborn 2006). Wang and 
Osborn’s model tried to minimize impact on the role 
hierarchy and overcomes the shortcomings of the user to 
role assignment approach (Wang et al. 2006).  
The most interesting approach is described in the model 
of Yin et al. (Yin et al. 2004). This model has potential to 
address some issues of delegation in federated systems. 
Yin et al. have discussed a decentralized delegation 
model with constraints resolution, management domain, 
etc. for distributed systems (Yin et al. 2004). The model 
divides access control in large, distributed systems into 
two levels: the management level and the request level. 
At the management level, the system consists of “multi-
centric” management which has its own authorisation 
management domain (Yin et al. 2004). At the request 
level, normal users make a cascaded request which 
requires more than one service to respond to the request. 
The model classifies delegation into two levels 
corresponding to the levels mentioned above. At the 
authorisation management level, the delegation is called 
delegation of authority. At the request level, the 
delegation is called delegation of capability which can be 
effectively considered as grant/transfer access control 
privilege. As mentioned above, this model, to some 
extent, can address some similar issues of delegation in 
federated system. However, it does not fully solve the 
issues of delegation commitment, inconsistency of 
privilege attributes or access control policies in 
delegation operation across component systems in the 
federation or across federations. So, these issues remain 
an open research problem. 
It is obvious that delegation is a significant problem in 
managing authentication and authorisation. Except the 
models of Yin et al. and Wang and Osborn, so far, it is 
safe to say that most delegation models are centralised 
and based on user to role assignment. More importantly, 
with the exception of some delegation models such as 
Atluri and Warner (Atluri and Warner 2005) or Wainer 
and Kumar (Wainer and Kumar 2005) which pay some 
attention to delegation constraints such as time intervals, 
workload, etc., few models address the issue of 
commitments, especially tracking the commitment in the 
delegation process. 
4 Delegation and Commitment of Involved 
Parties 
This section explains the conceptual issue of commitment 
in the delegation process and the role of the involved 
parties.  
In general, the followings are the basic entities involved 
in the delegation process. 
• Delegator is the entity which has necessary 
privilege attributes and is authorised to delegate 
those privilege attributes to the delegatee (the 
receiver of delegation assertion). 
• Delegatee is an entity that is delegated the 
necessary privilege attributes to access resources 
controlled by Service Provider on behalf of the 
delegator. 
• Authorisation Authority is the entity which is 
able to verify authorisation decision, regarding 
access requests from users. 
• Service Provider is an entity which controls and 
provides a service to users. The Service Provider 
provides services based on the authorisation 
decision of Authorisation Authority. Service 
Provider and Authorisation Authority can be one 
entity. 
In this paper, it is assumed that each Service Provider and 
delegators/delegatees in different security domains have 
an Authorisation Authority. In addition, due to the 
autonomous nature of federated systems, it is not 
uncommon that the delegatee will come from a different 
security domain and/or the delegator may not have had 
prior contacts with the delegatee. So from the trust 
perspective, it is reasonable to assume that the delegator 
trusts the Authorisation Authority and Service Provider 
more than the delegatee. 
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Figure 1: An example of direct delegation transaction 
Figure 1 depicts a typical direct delegation with the 
involvement of two entities in which an initial delegator 
on system S(1) subsequently grants some necessary 
privilege attributes to the delegatee on system S(2) to 
allow access to the necessary service. 
In any user delegation model, the delegated privilege 
attributes are all or a subset of delegator’s privilege 
attributes. The delegator manages to transfer or grant 
these privilege attributes to the delegatee with some 
constraints or conditions such as information about the 
Service Provider, the service to be invoked, times and 
duration of invocation, etc. As discussed in Section 2, in 
our model, some of those conditions and constraints form 
the commitment of the delegator, delegatee and other 
involved parties such as Authorisation Authority and 
Service Provider. In our model, making agreement on the 
commitment and tracking the commitment are the first 
and the last step of the delegation process. 
Pre-delegation Commitment 
The pre-delegation commitment phase focuses on the 
constraints and conditions of the involved parties. For the 
delegation to happen, the constraints and conditions must 
be expressed clearly and exchanged to both parties 
involved. As the delegation process in the paper focuses 
on user delegation, the delegator will have the authority 
upon the pre-delegation commitment negotiation with the 
delegatee. 
In the direct delegation process, from the delegator’s 
perspective, the delegator will have to focus on the 
following tasks: 
• Checking the validity of delegation request and 
making decisions regarding conditions and 
commitment such as duration, access times, etc. 
• Forming delegator’s conditions and commitment 
• In some cases, the delegator has to negotiate the 
conditions and commitment with the relevant 
Service Provider and Authorisation Authority to 
notify or verify with these parties about the 
commitment of the delegatee. 
From the delegatee’s perspective, if the delegation 
request is accepted by the delegator, the delegatee also 
has to complete the following duties to make the 
delegation progress: 
• Checking the validity of delegator’s assertion. 
• Making decision regarding to the conditions and 
commitment set by delegator. Sometimes, if the 
original request is changed by the delegator, the 
delegatee must be aware and repeat the 
commitment negotiation process. 
From the Service Provider and Authorisation Authority’s 
perspective, the pre-delegation commitment is not 
particularly important as they are not really involved with 
the negotiation between the delegator and the delegatee. 
Post-delegation Commitment 
After the delegatee receives the delegation assertion, it 
must check the validity and determine whether to accept 
the delegation (after accepting the pre-delegation 
commitment). Then the delegatee should have the ability 
to invoke the necessary services from the Service 
Provider using the delegated attributes. 
When the Service Provider receives requests from the 
delegatee for a particular service using delegated 
attributes, the Service Provider can ask or divert the 
delegatee to the Authorisation Authority to confirm the 
eligibility of the delegatee for the requested services. If 
the Authorisation Authority grants the access, the 
delegatee now can enjoy the service from the Service 
Provider. It should be noted that the Authorisation 
Authority of the system, on behalf of the Service 
Provider, makes the access control decisions. The 
delegation assertion is an authorisation for delegation, not 
for granting access to services. 
After these interactions, the involved parties need to 
perform the post-delegation activities which primarily 
keep track of the activities and conditions set by the 
involved parties in the pre-delegation commitment 
negotiation. A typical activity for post-delegation 
commitment is to update delegation information of the 
involved parties, especially delegator and delegatee to 
maintain the consistency of the delegation status. 
Naturally, the post-delegation commitment is quite 
simple in comparison to the pre-delegation commitment.  
From the Authorisation Authority and Service Provider’s 
perspective, the only task they have to do is to notify the 
delegator about the request of the delegatee. 
The delegatee then also may choose to inform the 
delegator that the delegation assertion was used so that 
the delegator can finalise the process of keeping track and 
monitoring the delegation transaction. The delegator also 
needs to do some management tasks such as updating 
information related to the delegation. 
Pre- and Post-Delegation Commitment in Indirect 
Delegation 
In an indirect delegation chain, the situation becomes 
more complicated with the involvement of intermediate 
entities which act as brokers between the original 
delegator and final delegatee. 
Figure 2 illustrates an indirect delegation where multiple 
delegations recursively happen to form a chain of 
delegations from the original delegator to the final 
delegatee via multiple intermediate entities which, in 
turn, act in the role of both delegator and delegatee. 
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Figure 2: An indirect delegation chain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 2, there are n entities involved in the delegation 
process. Except the first and the last entities which are 
respectively the delegator and delegatee, all other entities 
will act in both roles. For example, in the delegation 
chain, entity U(k) will accept some delegated privilege 
attributes from U(k-1) to be a delegatee. Entity U(k), in 
turn, will transfer those privilege attributes to U(k+1) to 
effectively be a delegator. The final delegatee U(n) will 
be the actual entity which asks for the delegation from the 
beginning.  
From the delegation commitment perspective, it is quite 
difficult to define and keep track of the commitment of 
the intermediate entities because in some cases, both 
delegatee and delegator will not be able to get the 
information of intermediate entities of the delegation 
chain in advance. So, it is not feasible to define pre-
delegation commitment for these entities. Instead, a 
generic “forward and keep-track” post-delegation 
commitment should be enforced. 
Thus, the intermediate entities have to commit the 
following tasks: 
• Notify the previous delegatee after forwarding 
the delegation assertion to the next delegatee in 
the chain. 
• Notify the original delegator so that the 
delegator can keep track of the development of 
the delegation chain. 
5 Commitment Enforcement Framework 
This section provides a framework for expressing and 
enforcing the commitment of the involved parties in the 
delegation process. For simplicity, only commitment of 
the involved parties in direct delegation will be discussed. 
In this section, SAML will be used as the means to carry 
information in the delegation negotiation process. SAML 
has been selected due to its expressiveness and the 
compatibility with various standards and implementations 
such as Shibboleth and Liberty Alliance.  
5.1 Delegation Commitment Assertion 
Delegation commitment assertion is the SAML assertion 
(Cantor et al. 2005) used in the commitment negotiation 
process. By way of example, the discussion will now 
centre upon SAML as means to exchange the delegation 
commitment assertion. However, SAML assertion is not 
designed to carry delegation commitment assertions 
directly. So, the assertion is based on a basic set of 
elements and some extensions as proposed on Gomi et al. 
and Wang et al. (Gomi et al. 2005; Wang et al. 2005). 
Based on vocabularies of SAML 2.0, Gomi et al. (Gomi 
et al. 2005), Wang et al. (Wang et al. 2005) and Cantor 
(Cantor 2005) proposed a basic set of  elements for a 
delegation assertion as follows:  
 
SAML Delegation Commitment Assertion
AssertionID MajorVersion
IssueInstant MinorVersion
Issuer (Delegator)
Authentication Statement
---------------------------------------
Subject (UserID)
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AuthenticationMechanism
Attribute Statement
---------------------------------------
DelegatorID/DelegateeID
DelegationID
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ServiceProviderDescription
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Figure 3: A typical structure of a SAML delegation commitment assertion  
(extended from Gomi et al. (Gomi et al. 2005) and Wang et al. (Wang et al. 2005)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Issuer: the issuer of the assertion which could be 
the delegator or delegatee 
• Signature: the digital signature of the delegator 
for integrity protection 
• Subject: principal’s information. This contains 
the principal’s name identifier 
• Conditions: the valid duration of the assertion 
• DelegatorID: the delegator’s identity 
• DelegateeID: the delegatee’s identity 
• DelegationID: the unique identifier of the 
delegation transaction. This value will be 
assigned by the initialised party (can be either 
delegatee or delegator) and will be maintained 
uniquely for the whole delegation process  
• IsDelegatable: indicates whether the delegation 
assertion can be further delegatable. It will be 
used for multiple delegations 
This is just the basic set of elements. To support 
delegation, the SAML AttributeStatement field is 
extended to combine delegation information such as 
user’s privilege attributes (Gomi et al. 2005; Wang et al. 
2005).  
Based on their designs, we extend and modify some 
elements to achieve the purpose of supporting 
commitment negotiation process. Figure 3 depicts a 
modified SAML assertion to perform delegation. The 
AttributeStatement and Conditions are extended to 
contain the following sub-elements and attributes: 
• DelegatedAttributeName: the name of the 
privilege attribute subjected to delegation 
• DelegationDepth: the maximum number of 
times which the assertion can be delegated (the 
depth of delegation chain) 
• DelegationUsageQuote: the maximum number 
of times which the assertion can be used 
• ServiceProvider: the resource which the 
delegatee wants to access 
• ServiceProviderDescription: the human readable 
description for the above service 
• DelegationDescription: general description 
about the delegation transaction 
The Conditions elements will be used to set the validity 
of the assertion. 
5.2 Pre-Delegation Commitment 
This section proposes the new basic protocol to achieve 
the pre-delegation commitment of delegator and 
delegatee. For the sake of simplicity, it assumes that the 
authentication and authorisation mechanisms are already 
in place. Issues such as how delegation requests can be 
initiated and validated, how identities of delegator and 
delegatee can be verified, etc. are out of scope. 
Assuming that there is a user who wants to access a 
resource R1 via ServiceProvider SP1 which he/she does 
not possess necessary privileges (p1 and p2). The user; 
now is the delegatee; will have to ask another user, 
delegator, to delegate him/her some certain privilege 
attributes. 
Figure 4 depicts the basic flow diagram for the concept of 
the pre-delegation commitment. 
Delegatee Commitment 
From the delegatee’s perspective, the delegatee will have 
to do the following steps: 
1. Delegatee starts the delegation process by sending a 
request for delegation. This is just to inform the delegator 
that the delegatee is asking for delegation. 
2. The delegator will respond and ask for the commitment 
of delegatee. 
3. The delegatee now sends to the delegator an assertion 
to express the following information: 
• The task the delegatee wants to perform 
• The involved service provider  
• The necessary valid duration (how long for the 
delegation to last)? 
• How many times the delegation assertion can be 
used? 
• The proposed security context and/or access 
control profile for the delegation transaction. 
This is to allow the delegatee to suggest a 
security context it is capable of using.  
• If possible, in some cases, the delegatee should 
suggest the necessary privilege attributes. 
These factors form the pre-delegation commitment of 
delegatee. This assertion will be kept by the delegator for 
tracking purposes later.  
Delegator Commitment 
The delegator will consequently assess the request. 
Assume that the delegator agrees to grant the request. 
4. The delegator now can issue an assertion which 
contains the following information: 
• Valid duration 
• The number of times the delegation assertion 
can be used. Security context of validation: for 
example only valid for the service provider on 
system S(1) or with service providers in the 
federation F(1). 
• Require or not require confirmation upon 
finishing the use of delegation assertion. 
These factors form the pre-delegation commitment of 
delegator. This assertion, a commitment assertion, will be 
kept by the delegator for tracking purposes later. By 
issuing this assertion, the delegator is now responsible for 
any verification requests related to this assertion within 
the valid duration. 
Delegator
1. Delegation Request
Delegatee
2. Request for commitment assertion
3. Commitment assertion
4. Commitment assertion of delegator
System S(1) System S(2)
6. Commitment ackowledged
5. Store the delegation information
U(1) U(2)
 
Figure 4: Pre-delegation commitment exchanged between delegator and delegatee 
5. Keep track of the use of delegation assertion by putting 
them into a tracking list. The list is the mapping of 
delegatee’s identity and DelegationID. This list will be 
stored personally by the delegator. A storage mechanism 
will be defined by the delegator or the delegator’s system 
authority personally to preserve the autonomy of the 
federation. 
6. The delegatee then has to confirm that it agrees with 
this arrangement. 
5.3 Post-Delegation Commitment 
After each service invocation, the involved parties need 
to complete the commitment by doing the work which is 
committed. In the post-delegation phase, the commitment 
is mostly the responsibility of delegatee because the 
delegator only needs to monitor and keep track of the 
progress by waiting for the feedback from the delegatee, 
the Service Provider and the Authorisation Authority. 
Figure 5 depicts the basic flow diagram for the concept of 
the post-delegation commitment. 
1. The Authorisation Authority needs to let the delegator 
know the delegated privilege attributes were used. The 
Authorisation Authority will send the delegator and the 
Service Provider the assertion with the following 
information: 
• Request from delegatee 
• Timestamp of the request 
2. The Service Provider needs to let the delegator know 
that the delegated privilege attributes were used. The 
Service Provider will send the delegator the assertion 
with the following information: 
• Request from delegatee 
• Timestamp of the request 
3. The delegatee needs to conduct the post-delegation 
commitment. However, due to the trust relationship with 
delegator, it does not need to report back to the delegator. 
• Reduce the DelegationUsageQuote 
4. The delegator needs to accept the confirmation from 
both sides (service provider and authorisation authority) 
and store the confirmations for tracking purposes.  
5. The delegator also needs to reduce the 
DelegationUsageQuote by one or marks the delegation 
assertion as expired if the quote reaches zero. 
Due to the trust assumption in which delegatee is not 
trusted by the delegator, there is no need for the delegatee 
to report back to the delegator. The delegator will rely on 
the report from Authorisation Authority and Service 
Provider for the tracking purpose. 
6 Discussion and Future Work 
In the models of Gomi et al. and Wang et al., delegator’s 
privileges are transferred from a delegator to delegatee in 
accordance with the order of delegation assertion flow 
(Gomi et al. 2005; Wang et al. 2005). The main 
philosophy behind both models is that the design only 
creates the environment (framework) for users to 
communicate and perform delegation. The rest (such as 
how to verify the assertion, how to use the assertion, etc.) 
is merely up to the involved parties. So, it would be 
difficult to say whether the model supports grant or 
transfer delegation.  
 Figure 5: Post-delegation commitment exchanges between involved parties
In general, this is a good delegation mechanism as it is 
quite clear and simple in terms of administration. It 
allows the federation to keep track and trace back any 
delegation transaction and so be able to maintain a 
precise authorisation state of user at a given time. 
However, it lacks the capability to check for the 
constraints and resolve the conflicts between delegated 
privilege attributes and between the delegated privileges 
with the involved policies. The models also ignored the 
delegatee’s role constraint and conflict resolution as they 
do not mention about how the delegated privilege 
attributes will be fitted into the current privilege attribute 
set of the delegatee. The model also ignored the issue of 
commitment of involve parties. 
By addressing the commitment issue, the protocol 
expressed in this paper can be considered as an extension 
to these models. In fact, the mechanism is a monitoring 
and checking approach. The mechanism provides means 
to monitor and keep track the delegation process. The 
tracking information can be used later for trust 
assessment or making revocation when necessary. Thus, 
the mechanism can be considered as a complement 
module to provide a more conservative protection, more 
manageable delegation process in federated systems. The 
mechanism also preserves room for future improvement 
with the consideration of security context suggested by 
the delegatee. However, in this model, we have not 
discussed thoroughly the roles and commitments of 
Authorisation Authority and Service Provider. The pre-
delegation commitment which contains some delegation 
conditions and constraints of Authorisation Authority and 
Service Provider is an interesting and important aspect 
which needs to be addressed. Our mechanism also 
ignores the issues of delegatee’s role constraint and 
conflict resolution and considers it as part of future work. 
In addition, for simplicity, the indirect delegation is not 
thoroughly analysed. The mechanism detailed in this 
paper only looks at direct delegation between the 
involved parties. So, this paper does not sufficiently 
address the necessary commitment in case of indirect 
delegation with the involvement of multiple parties in the 
delegation process. In case of indirect delegation, the 
commitment of the intermediate parties maybe varied. 
This makes the task of keeping track of their 
commitments very complicated. When the number of 
intermediate parties grows large, the protocol will 
become too complex with a lot of delegation assertions to 
be exchanged. So there is also an issue of how to improve 
the simplicity and clarification of the mechanism. The 
ability of keeping track of commitment can also lead to 
the investigation of the issue of trust of access control via 
delegation. In addition, the future works will also extend 
the security context and consider the commitment of 
other involved parties such as delegation authority, 
identity provider and authentication and authorisation 
authority. Role constraint and conflict resolution for the 
delegation process will also form an important part of the 
future work. 
7 Conclusion 
This paper discusses the initial concept of delegation 
commitment and proposes a simple scheme to monitor 
and keep track of the commitment of the involved parties 
when requesting delegation assertion for a particular task. 
This paper introduces a mechanism to help parties 
involved in the delegation process to express commitment 
constraints, perform the commitments and track the 
committed actions. The mechanism looks at two different 
aspects: pre-delegation commitment and post-delegation 
commitment. In pre-delegation commitment, the 
mechanism enables the involved parties to express the 
delegation constraints and address those constraints. The 
post-delegation commitment phase enables those parties 
to inform the delegator and service providers about how 
the commitments are conducted. The mechanism utilises 
modified SAML assertion structures to support the 
delegation purposes. Future work includes investigation 
of indirect delegation as well as role and commitments of 
other involved parties such as Identity Provider, 
Authentication and Authorisation Authority and Service 
Provider as well as role constraint and conflict resolution. 
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